




Liability For Direct Advertising of Drugs to
Consumers: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come
Aaron Twerski
Brooklyn Law School, aaron.twerski@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Litigation
Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
33 Hofstra L. Rev. 1149 (2004-2005)
LIABILITY FOR DIRECT ADVERTISING OF
DRUGS TO CONSUMERS: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME
HAS NOT COME
Aaron D. Twerski*
It's a puzzlement: If anyone had taken a poll of product liability
cognoscenti a decade ago as to whether the learned intermediary rule
would survive in the face of the onslaught of massive advertising of
drugs in the media, the overwhelming majority would have answered in
the negative. The well entrenched doctrine requires that a
pharmaceutical manufacturer provide warnings of risks attendant to
ingesting a prescription drug to the physician only and not to the
patient.' The principal rationale for the learned intermediary rule is that
information concerning risks should be delivered to the physician who is
tutored in the science of understanding risk and evaluating risk
contextually. 2 The physician is then charged with the responsibility of
picking and choosing among the multitude of risks posed by a drug and
then deciding how the risk information is to be communicated to the
patient. The basis for the rule is seriously undercut when drugs such as
Lipitor, Rogaine, Viagra, and Celebrex are huckstered to the public as if
they were M&M candies. If one advertises directly to patients seeking to
entice them to urge their physicians to prescribe a drug then one should
have a concomitant duty to directly warn the patient of risks associated
* Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., § 6(d)(1) (1998) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 365 (2000); DAVID G. OWEN, THE LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9.6 (2005).
2. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 6 cmt. b. Other rationales have been used to support the
rule. See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999) (identifying four
theoretical bases for the learned intermediary rule: (1) reluctance to interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship; (2) physicians are in a superior position to convey information to patients; (3) lack of
effective means to communicate directly with patients; and (4) inability of patients to comprehend
complex drug warnings).
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with their use.3 Pharmaceutical manufacturers should not be able to
bypass physicians by marketing directly to consumers and then hide
behind the fagade of physician expertise to immunize themselves from
liability.
When Professor Henderson and I faced this issue in drafting the
Products Liability Restatement in 1994, we took the position that for
prescription drugs advertised in the media, drug manufacturers forfeited
their "learned intermediary" immunity.4 Only when the American Law
Institute Council cautioned us about taking this position without support
in the case law did we then back down. Instead of a firm black letter
rule, we drafted language stating the opposing views on the subject and
relegated the issue to developing case law.5 But, in my heart, I was
certain that our evasive language would have a short shelf life. The case
law would in quick order vindicate our original position.
The ink was hardly dry on the final version of the Products
Liability Restatement when the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote its
bombshell decision in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.6 The Court had
read our earlier draft and paid little attention to the fact that we had taken
no firm position on the learned intermediary rule.7 If the issue was to be
left to developing case law, New Jersey would be the first on the
bandwagon. Norplant, a contraceptive implant, had been widely
marketed in women's magazines without revealing to potential users a
host of side effects that came with its use. The court rehearsed all of the
arguments as to why a drug that required a prescription by a physician
should have the warning delivered to the physician and not the patient.
And with the ease of a marksman shooting ducks in a pond, it knocked
them off one by one. It was a tour-de-force. The learned intermediary
rule belonged to history. Like Henningson9 and Greenman,10 Perez
3. See, e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and
the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829 (1991); Tim S. Hall, Note,
Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability For Failure to Warn in Direct-to-
Consumers Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449 (1993); Bradford B.
Lear, Note, The Learned Intermediary Rule in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65 MO. L.
REv 1101 (2000).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. e (Council Draft No. IA
1994). For a description of the evolution of the Restatement's rule on learned intermediaries for
drugs that are advertised in the media, see Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to
Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 161-68 (1997).
5. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 6 cmt. e.
6. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
7. Id. at 1253.
8. Id. at 1255-56.
9. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
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would take its place in products liability history as the case that broke
the dam. It would only be a matter of time and it would be all over.
The strange thing is that seven years have passed and nothing has
happened. Courts have not signed on to the revolution." Simple logic
has not triumphed. The question is, why? It does no good to repeat the
argument of drug manufacturers that a prescription drug can only reach
the hands of patients after the physician has made a decision to prescribe
the drug for the specific patient and that the doctor is in the best position
to assess the risks and benefits and relay that information to the patient.
Advertising seeks to empower patients and to create a demand for a drug
that would otherwise not emanate from the physician. Having changed
the dynamic as to how drugs are prescribed, the flow of information
should change as well.
The few cases that have dealt with liability stemming from drug
advertising have not addressed a fundamental policy question: Does
direct marketing of drugs to the public serve the commonweal? The
medical profession finds media advertisements to be an intrusion into
their role in ministering healthcare to patients. They do not take kindly
to patients demanding, requesting, or even suggesting certain drug
therapies. 2 Pressures to prescribe medication are often hard to resist
even when the physician believes that it is not in the patient's best
interest to take the drug. On the other hand, one cannot deny that drug
advertising has raised the awareness of patients with regard to the
availability of drug therapies and to the underlying conditions that need
medical attention. 13 The aggressive marketing of a wide variety of anti-
cholesterol drugs has almost certainly encouraged patients to be tested
and treated for high cholesterol. And when one drug is not well
tolerated, instead of discontinuing taking the drug without informing the
physician, patients are more likely to explore alternatives with their
10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
11. See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive, 215 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (granting
summary judgment for defendant on claims of failing-to-warn consumers directly for all states,
except New Jersey).
12. See Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising: A Seminar Examines the Plethora of
Prescription Drug Pitches Since Regulations Were Loosened, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at DI 1
(describing a survey in which 79% of physicians reported that they were concerned that relaxed
direct-marketing guidelines would lead to patients demanding unecessary drug treatments); Melissa
Healy, Wary, and Weary, of Drug Ads: The Messages are Everywhere, but Now Some Lawmakers,
Consumers and Physicians are Saying, "Enough", L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at F1 (discussing the
increase in patients who are "pestering" their physicians for advertised drugs).
13. See Elliott, supra note 12 (finding that 65% of doctors surveyed said that the most




physicians. Similarly, male patients suffering from hypertension often do
not take drugs designed to reduce their blood pressure. Many patients on
anti-hypertension medication manifest a reduction in libido and/or
impotence. With the advent of such drugs as Viagra, Levitra, and Cialis,
patients are more prone to discuss their sexual problems with their
physicians rather than unilaterally stopping to take the medication
because of the negative side effects. Furthermore, the fact that there has
been a huge amount of advertising of these drugs has encouraged many
who could not bring themselves to discuss their sexual problems with
their physician to do so for the first time.
What does this debate about the net worth to society of drug
advertising have to do with whether drug companies should be required
to warn directly to the public when the drugs are advertised in the
media? In my opinion, once one chooses a side on either side of the
question, the issue of the learned intermediary rule resolves itself. If one
believes that media advertisement of prescription drugs is a bad idea,
one will have little sympathy for providing drug companies with an
immunity from liability because they adequately warned physicians. If,
however, media advertisements are viewed as social good, then courts
will have to grapple with the problem that there are real limitations on
the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to warn patients about risks
attached to taking a drug.
The problem is elementary. It is far easier to describe the benefits
of a drug then it is to portray its risks. Think about the drugs you have
seen advertised. The first page is what I call the "smiley" page. A patient
suffering from arthritis, impotence, or depression is pictured as happy
once the yoke of disease has been lifted from his shoulder. Drug benefits
are targeted to specific conditions and the alleviation of an undesirable
condition is a story simply told. 14 Negative drug side effects are far more
nuanced and infinitely more difficult to communicate. Look at a typical
package insert often set forth on the reverse side of the smiley page.
Frequency, severity, and short and long-term implications to the patient
must be dealt with for scores of possible side effects. The fact that the
manufacturer gave some warning on the "unhappy" page will be of
small solace to the pharmaceutical manufacturer. Indeed having
recognized the risk, the claim will be that the warning was not
14. Accurate portrayal of benefits can be nuanced as well. For example, how efficacious is a
drug; what percentage of patients are helped by a drug; are there other substitutes that are less
costly; are all questions that go to the benefit side of the equation.
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adequate.' 5 Plaintiffs will argue that the warning should have been more
direct, bolder, and more threatening. That risks and warnings must be
hierarchical may be unconvincing to a jury and the adequacy of warning
is almost always a jury issue.
Furthermore, it is no easy matter to communicate risk in context. Is
the risk of any given side effect equivalent to the frequency of being
killed in an airplane crash or crossing the street in a crowded urban
environment? Or is it like the risk of being injured when speeding 30
miles per hour over the limit? The only certain refuge from uncertain or
perhaps limitless liability for failure to warn is the learned intermediary
rule. Of all theories of product liability, failure-to-warn has the least
rigor and is thus not subject to significant judicial control over
unwarranted jury discretion. 16 Without the learned intermediary rule,
direct advertising failure-to-wam cases are likely to constitute an
expansive and expensive category of liability.
I do not choose sides on the fundamental question as to whether the
world is a better place because of direct consumer marketing of
prescription drugs. I admit to considerable ambivalence on this issue.
But for the first time I see the issue of direct warning in a different light.
We simply cannot have our cake and eat it too. Contrary to my original
thinking, it cannot glibly be said, "If you can successfully market a drug,
you can adequately warn against its side effects." The two are very
different enterprises.
Drug manufacturers have done much better in recent years in
communicating to consumers about drug side effects. One need only to
peruse drug advertisements to see that common side effects are being
warned against. That they are now more prominent and easier to
understand is probably due to the threat of product liability litigation.
Nonetheless, there is just no way that drug side effects can be as
effectively communicated as drug benefits. 17 Therein lies the dilemma.
15. Richard E. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort
Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 137 (2002) ("It is
difficult to see how drug manufacturers can provide consumers with complete and understandable
information about product related risks through direct communication."); Noah, supra note 4, at 174
("Once the duty to warn expands, risk information contained in the advertisements would not satisfy
a drug manufacturer's duty to warn patients directly.").
16. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990).
17. Pharmaceutical manufacturers of prescription drugs may be able to comply with the FDA
requirement that print media advertisements present a "fair balance" of a drug's benefits and
detriments, see 21 C.F.R. § 2021(e)(5)(ii), (6)(i)-(v), but still be open to liability because a jury
would find that the warning was not strong enough and thus inadequate under classic product
liability failure-to-warn doctrine. See Ausness, supra note 15, at 137.
2005]
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Ultimately, the learned intermediary defense will stand or fall based on
whether we view drug advertisements as an important public good or as
an avaricious over-reaching by the pharmaceutical manufacturers to
force unwanted and unnecessary drugs on the American public.
